Despite the numerous retellings of the horror and the attempts by scholars to understand the Holo caust, it still raises unresolved, ago nizing questions. Why did it happen? How was it possible for civilized per sons to torture, maim, and destroy other human beings? Why was there not more resistance by the victims? Why were the Protestant churches largely inactive and the Vatican si lent? Where was God? Why was it that the greatest crime in history was of only marginal interest to the Al lies? To these questions, David Wy man, a historian at the University of Massachusetts, a Protestant, and a friend of Zionism, adds another: Why did America make so little effort to rescue jews from annihilation?
The standard reply to Wyman's question is that rescue was not possi ble and that the only way to save jewish lives was to win the war as quickly as possible. Wyman clearly demonstrates that these answers are inadequate. But in so doing, he re veals aspects of American life during the Holocaust-basic attitudes, the failures of public institutions, the cal lousness of public officials, the intel lectual poverty of the media, the con flicts among American jewish organizations, and, in some cases, priorities higher than rescue--that, given the Nazi attempt at genocide, are profoundly disturbing.
Wyman is not the first to have raised the question of rescue, but his book has such range and the infor mation he has uncovered is pre sented with such care, that it is likely to figure in any future discussion of America's response to the Holocaust. In a certain sense, though, what makes this such a powerful and dis turbing book is the assumption he makes about the writing of history. For Wyman, as for the Puritans, his tory is a story of good and evil, of moral obligations thrust upon us and then betrayed, not so much by a ma levolent heart as by indifference. Or we betray our obligations and thus our fellow men and women, because we have too little faith-because we cannot do everything, we conclude that nothing can be done; because we cannot stop the slaughter, we rule out attempts at rescue.
Though these beliefs may strike historians as quaint or worse and be suspect because they grow out of reli gious commitment, Wyman in fact stands on firm psychological ground given his topic. A sense of moral obligation for, a sensitivity to, and a concern for the sufferings of the jews, and a belief in the possibility of action, were preconditions of any ef fective rescue program. In one way or another, as Wyman indicates, these were lacking in America throughout the Holocaust.
The Abandonment of the Jews is, then, an important study in the his tory of morality, set against the back ground of some of the most horrify ing events in human experience. On the surface, it is a straightforward account of the politics of rescue that took place in the United States over a four-year period. On a deeper level, the book is a study of moral obliga tion and moral failure in a particular time and place. But there is another dimension that is perhaps more uni versal-issues about information and understanding, human solidarity, the limits of the imagination, the na ture of moral judgment, and the question of whether individuals, for better or worse, can make a differ ence in a world seemingly dominated by large-scale institutions and the im personal forces of history. On this level his answers are often illuminat ing, but it is here also that he weak ens to some extent both his descrip tive account and his moral as sessment of the politics of rescue. He does so by not distinguishing be tween "belief" and "understanding" and through a partially flawed con ception of moral judgment, one that he shares with many of us. I shall return to these problems later.
A mother and daughter were at the head of a line going into the gas chambers of Belzec. As they entered, a witness heard the child say, "Mother, it's dark, it's so dark, and I was being so good." No one can say whether this mother and child might have been saved had the United States in November 1942, when it knew the worst, begun a serious ef fort to rescue as many as possible of those facing extermination. But it is probable that had the United States set up a war refugee board early in the war, several hundred thousand jews could have been saved without in any way hampering the war effort. As it was, no rescue effort was begun until 14 months after the U. Thus, though the only way to stop the Holocaust itself was by winning the war, it was possible to save lives through rescue efforts. The moral duty to do so was overwhelming. Why, then, did the American effort begin so late and why did it offer much less than it might have? Wy man's account, as befits a historian, is specific and detailed: he discusses the State Department, the British Foreign Office, the American people, Franklin Roosevelt, the media, the churches, and various American jew ish organizations. In different ways, each of these fails in terms of either solidarity with the victims or faith in the possibility of rescue.
Wyman's categories are valid, but they are also narrow. He misses the tendency for both the Departments of State and War to place bureaucratic routine and a narrow conception of their mission above the value of hu man life. And he all but misses an issue crucial to both the reasons for the behavior of the persons and groups he discusses and a genuine assessment of their moral responsi bility: the difference between "believ ing" and "understanding." This is a matter treated with great skill (and less moral harshness) by Walter La queur in a related book, The Terrible Secret. To possess information about the killing of the Jews was not in itself to understand what was taking place; to believe that a process of extermination was underway was not necessarily to grasp the full sig nificance of it. Even those who "knew" had little idea of what a holo caust actually meant. It was only when the camps (which were not even the extermination centers) were liberated that the horror set in. One might add that, in many ways, the world still does not understand: the United Nations Convention on Gen ocide, for example, defines the crime in such a way that "liquidating" 20 million Kulaks is not considered to be genocide, but transferring children from one group to another is.
Though some of Wyman's inter pretations may be questioned, his major conclusions do rest on massive documentation. Individually and col lectively, they point to a moral disas ter of the highest order.
1. The American people were un willing to accept a large number of refugees. Since the 1930s there had been strong "nativist" trends, and the fear of unemployment continued; there was also some anti-Semitism. At the same time, most Americans did not know what was happening to the Jews in Europe. The media gave little coverage to the atrocities, and when reported, they were generally merged with other news about the war. Coverage of the Holocaust was sporadic and presented with little emphasis; it was treated as minor news. There are tragedies here, but to paper over the enormous differences is to subvert morality at its core. Even if we put aside the question of suffer ing (and how could we?), the jews had no choice-destruction was forced on them; Christians and other bystanders had a choice-their moral failures are their own. Moreover, when Wyman speaks of the tragedy of humankind, he misses an impor tant point about the very nature of genocide. That many human beings stood by and did nothing is not a matter of tragedy but rather shame. The tragedy for humankind is that genocide distorts and alters the very meaning of "humankind." To elimi nate a whole people is to reduce the essential plurality of the human con dition-to destroy for all time partic ular biological and cultural possibili ties. In this sense, genocide is a crime not only against a particular people, but against all people. Genocide, of course, is a crime in another sense: for a particular group to appropriate to itself the right to determine what groups are human is a threat to the existence of all other humans.
Wyman writes about the past, but it is out of concern for the present and the future that he asks: Would the American response to the Holo caust be different today? Would Americans again be unknowing, un caring, and content to leave the prob lem to the victims to solve? One way to give a tentative answer is to extend his question (there are also strong moral reasons for this) so that it re fers not only to the Holocaust, but to any mass victimization or suffering.
If the Holocaust could be ignored for years, as Wyman demonstrates it was, how can we be confident about attempts to help the victims of the future-victims not only of genocide, but of starvation, political repression, and the like? tugese, Russian, japanese, and Yid dish. In their original languages and in translation, these were dissemina ted throughout the world, primarily in academic circles, but some in the popular press as well.
What sparked it off was the arrival at the jesuit Mission in Beijing, one day in june 1601, of an elderly Chi nese gentleman named Ai Tian. He wanted to know about this foreign religion which, he had heard, wor shipped only one God like his own. Father Matteo Ricci, the Italian Supe rior of the Mission, hospitably showed him around, thinking he might be part of the Nestorian Chris tian sect that had preceded the jesu its to China by a thousand years.
In the chapel Ai saw a painting of the Madonna and Child on one side of the altar and a picture of john the Baptist (when very young) on the other side. He assumed them to be Rebecca with jacob and Esau. Notic ing also on the walls portraits of the Four Evangelists, he asked whether they were "four of the 12." Ricci thought he was talking about the Twelve Apostles, but Ai actually meant four of jacob's 12 sons, pro genitors of the Twelve Tribes of Israel.
Further conversation revealed that Ai was a jew, a member of a jewish community that had been in Kaifeng near the Yellow River in Honan prov ince for centuries, practicing its reli gion and maintaining a synagogue.
During the next 150 years, Catholic missionaries flocked to Kaifeng.
Their accounts of what they saw were published in several languages and circulated widely throughout Europe.
Their interest stemmed primarily from the beliefs that predictions of Christ's birth had deliberately been removed from the Old Testament by the Babylonian academicians who, between the fourth and seventh cen turies, prepared the vast body of in terpretative material known as the Talmud. If the Old Testament of the Kaifeng jews was pre-Christian in or igin, and indeed foretold the birth of jesus, wouldn't that prove the old scriptures had been tampered with, that the Jews had been deceived by the talmudic rabbis? And wouldn't that pave the way for a second com ing of Christ?
While the Jesuits were unable to find proof of talmudic falsifications, they did learn a number of things about the lives and customs of the Kaifeng Jews and wrote some in formative reports. Others, of diverse interests and from various lands, fol lowed in the eighteenth and nine teenth centuries, and added to the store of knowledge.
Most of the western scholars were, of necessity, limited in their under standing of Chinese language, his tory, and culture. Yet virtually noth ing was published abroad reflecting the views of the Chinese themselves. This was in no way due to a lack of academic diligence on the part of Sinologists. For one thing, Chinese research on the Jews did not begin until the eve of the twentieth cen tury. For another, Chinese treatises about the "Israelites," as they were called, were not widely published even in China until very recently.
I decided the best contribution I could make would be to collect all the material I could obtain on the subject by Chinese scholars and put it to gether in a book. But finding Chinese research turned out to be much more difficult than I had anticipated.
Tr aveling by plane, train, and bus in the autumn of 1982, I visited Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Xiamen (A moy), Guanzhou (C anton), Hangzhou, Yangshou, Shanghai, Ningbo, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, and Yinchuan. I met noted historians, ar chaeologists, and sociologists. They were helpful and provided valuable leads. Several promised to write spe cial articles for me. All agreed that the new government policy of ac tively encouraging academic studies had created a favorable environment for research. Those whose field was foreign religions said they were al ready probing into the development in China of such creeds as Nestorian ism and Manicheism, but had not previously considered Judaism. They were pleased I had called it to their attention and said it was a "blank spot," which they would attempt to fill. In Beijing I also had a number of enthusiastic responses and soon was able to include some remarkable new findings regarding Chinese Jews.
As a result I was able to translate, edit, and compile a volume of 12 es says of prominent Chinese scholars on the Jews of China. To gether they trace the history of the Chinese Jews from their beginnings to the present.
The book is called Jro.;s in Old China: Studies by Chinese Scholars, published by Hippocrene Books. Like scholars the world over, the Chinese disagree among themselves on ·some of the events and with their foreign coun terparts. Although their accounts are intricate, I found them highly stimu lating.
As the Chinese see it, Jewish events that are allegedly or, in fact, related to Chinese history, are the following:
• 722 B.C.: Assyria conquers Israel and exiles the ten tribes, which grad ually vanish. Various modern travel ers claim to have found remnants of them among the Tibetans, the Chi nese Qiang people, and the Ameri can Indians. The Chinese see no proof for any of these.
• Eighth century B.C.: Isaiah pro phesizes that the Jews will return from "Sinim." Some westerners as sert this means China, originating from Ch'in (Qin), the first dynasty to rule over a unified country. But, say the Chinese, there was no Ch'in (Qin) dynasty until 221 B.C., five centuries later, so such derivation was impossible. In any event, Sinim is now believed to have meant Aswan in southern Egypt.
• Fifth and fourth centuries B.C.: The Persians move a large segment of the Jewish population to Persia and Media, south of the Caspian Sea.
• 176 B.C.: Oppressive rule of Antiochus IV.
• 175 B. C.: Claimed arrival in Bombay by Kolaba Jews.
• 164 B.C.: Maccabees reconquer Jerusalem, thereafter celebrated as Hanukah by most Jews, but not by those in Bombay or Kaifeng. It is believed that this proves the Jews left their homeland before the Macca bean victory.
It was during the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.) that Persian and Arab merchants began sailing to China in large numbers. Jews who by then had been living among them for half a millenium came with them. Be cause the Jews were similar to them in physical appearance, wore the same clothes, spoke the same lan guage, and even adopted Arab or Persian names, the Chinese could not distinguish among them and placed them all in the same category:
"se mu ren"-people with colored eyes. Some settled in seaport cities such as Canton, Quanzh ou, Yanzhou, and Ningbo. Some moved north up the Grand Canal and the Bian River to Bianliang (Kaifeng) and other northern cities.
There is some evidence that Jews traveled with the caravans that came overland via the Silk Road, perhaps in the first and second centuries, and certainly to the middle of Tang. In the arid deserts of Xinjiang, once known as Chinese Tu rkestan, two important finds were made in the early years of this century. One was a letter, never sent, by a Persian Jew. It was written in Persian, using Hebrew script, and on paper which, at that time, only China manufactured. The other was a scrap of a Hebrew prayer also on paper.
But caravan treks were arduous, long, and dangerous, not the kind of trips on which a man would bring his family. Only when the constant wars among the small kingdoms in Xin jiang made the Silk Road too risky, and sea trade opened up in the eighth century, did fairly large-scale immigration become possible. This is the conclusion of the majority of Chi nese historians.
So far no tangible relics have been unearthed testifying to a Jewish pres ence in earlier times, although Chi nese silks, which could only have come by land caravans including Jews, were popular among Roman women.
For Northern Song (960-1127), we have an exact date, 998--and the name of the ruling emperior, Zhen Zong, set forth by a young Chinese scholar-as the specific time of the arrival of a group of Jews in Kaifeng. He proves this by an immigration registry which, he claims, could only mean that the arrivals were Jews.
After the Mongols conquered China and established their Yuan dy nasty (1279-1368), many Jews were mentioned in official documents. The Arabic "Jahud," the Persian "Djuhd," both from the Hebrew "Yehudi," were transliterated into Chinese pho netic equivalents such as "Zhuhu," "Zhuwu," or "Zhuhe," in laws and regulations concerning taxes and mil itary service. Several Chinese histor ians believe that when the Mongol armies returned from their conquests in the Middle East and southern Eu rope, many jews came with them, either voluntarily or as captives. From a Yuan regulation referring to jews "wherever they may be," it is obvious they had communities in various parts of China.
The fullest documentation we have of the history of the jews in China was written, in Chinese, by the jews themselves. Three stone in scriptions dated 1489, 1512, and 1663, engraved to commemorate rebuild ings of the Kaifeng synagogue, plus a tablet dated 1679 of the Zhao clan, together comprise a fairly complete story and also create considerable controversy. They called themselves "Israelites" and said that they came from the "Western Regions," a vague term which embraced India and the Middle East. But they disagreed on the date of arrival, the 1489 inscrip tion saying Song (960-1279), the 1512 inscription saying Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), and the 1663 inscription say ing Zhou (1066 B.C.-256 B.C.). The later the inscription, the earlier and therefore more venerable the claimed arrival date. But the inscriptions con tain a wealth of material on religious practices, philosophical concepts, and relations with other jewish communities.
The consensus of Chinese scholars is that 1163, the date given for the construction of the first Kaifeng syna gogue, is probably correct and that the jews must have arrived a few decades earlier. They also agree with the statement in the 1679 tablet set ting their number on reaching Kaifeng as 73 clans of some 500 fami lies. Most of the argument centers around where the jews lived be tween the time of the Diaspora in the first century A.D. and their arrival in China, probably in the tenth century.
Chinese historians note that ex cept for a contingent that migrated to Alexandria in Egypt, the majority of the jews moved east into Arabia, Per sia, Central Asia, and India. One school believes the Kaifeng jews came from India since the inscrip tions at the synagogue state that they brought cotton goods, �!:en manufac tured in India but not yet in China. Annotations to the Kaifeng prayer books, however, are partly in Persian without a single word of any of the Indian dialects. Of course, they could have called at an Indian port en route, or even spent some years there, but apparently not long enough to have lost their Persian.
It is true that there were and still are jews in India, near Bombay as well as in Khaibar. About 40 miles south of Bombay is the seaport of Kolaba. In its junjira district there are people who· call themselves "Ben-i Israel." They say they fled from the persecution of Greek Seleucid King Antiochus IV in 176 B.C. and settled in Kolaba a year later. The Khaibar jews claim an arrival in the sixth cen tury B. C. after the destruction of the First Temple in jerusalem.
The Durani, an ethnic group in Afghanistan, also refer to themselves as "Ben-i-lsrael" and claim descent from "Afghan," an alleged grandson of King Saul, who preceded David as king of the Israelites.
Some of the people of Kashmir, who strongly resemble the jews of biblical times, say they are descen dants of the Ten Lost Tribes.
All the foregoing stories are noted by Chinese scholars in my book with out judging their authenticity. They agree that there were jewish popula tions in those areas as well as places like Balkh (formerly Bactria), Bo khara, and Samarkand in Central Asia from which it was possible to enter China overland via the Silk Road, or to move south to the Indian seacoast and travel by ship.
Several Chinese scholars believe the list of cities once containing jewish com munities can and will be expanded as historical and archaeological research progresses in China. It seems un likely that most major commercial and cultural centers did not have at least some jewish settlements.
Kaifeng hosted the largest jewish community and lasted the longest. From 1163 to 1663, its synagogue was built and restored ten times, proof of the strength of its congregation and the support they received from jews in other cities. But as China's power dwindled and declined, so did the jewish communities. By the mid nineteenth century, most of them had vanished, except for a few Kaifeng families. The synagogue was no more, having been sold by the improverished survivors. Through centuries of intermarriage, the re maining jews looked and acted en tirely Chinese. No one could read Hebrew or conduct religious ser vices. A handful knew they were of jewish descent, but knew little about Judaism, its history or culture.
In a rather makeshift Kaifeng mu seum, I saw two of the tablets com memorating various restorations of the Kaifeng synagogue. The stones were so badly eroded that they were almost undecipherable. The site of the old synagogue, already an un sightly bog hole at the turn of the century, is now built over with new construction.
There have been minor influxes of Jews. The nineteenth century brought a number of Jewish settlers 6 from India and Iraq, congregating mainly in Shanghai. Jews fleeing the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in Russia tended to become fur traders and merchants in thina's northeast (Manchuria) and in the port of Tian jin (Tientsin). A fairly large contin gent of German and Austrian Jews who had escaped from Nazi persecu tion were living in a Shanghai ghetto in 1947 when I was requested by the U.S. Consulate to explain to them that American visas were hard to come by and that American streets were not really paved with gold.
From everything I have noted in Chinese and western studies, and from my own observations, I have come to the following tentative con clusions. The first sizable contingent of Jews came by ship from Persia, via India, and landed in the major sea port of Quanshou, in Fujian (Fukien) around the tenth century A.D. In the eleventh century, the majority of them (their children or grandchil dren) traveled up the Grand Canal from Yangzhou to Kaifeng, then to the capital of China. There they built a synagogue in the twelfth century. Other Jews, also mainly arriving by sea from India and the Middle East, settled in smaller numbers in other Chinese cities.
The Jews lived in freedom and equality with the Han Chinese, as did all foreign races and religious groups. Gradually they adopted Chi nese customs and abandoned their own. Finally, by the mid-nineteenth century, there was no one who could read Hebrew or conduct religious services. The Kaifeng synagogue had been the center of social and cultural, as well as religious, life. With its physical disintegration, the Jewish community dispersed and vanished. Other Jewish communities suffered the same fate, even earlier than the one in Kaifeng.
To day in China only a few relics remain. The Jews as a people and Judaism as a religion no longer exist. Some Chinese, however, know they are of Jewish descent. They are curi ous about their roots and are delving into their history. A growing number of Chinese scholars are also research ing the subject.
We therefore have reason to expect to team much more about Chinese Jews in the coming years: their ori gins, life, and contributions to Chinese culture. No doubt my "tentative conclusions" will require substantial amplification and revision, which I gladly welcome. The reader who expects to find the content of this book to reflect its title will be both disappointed and pleased. Disappointed because al most half the text is devoted, not to a discussion of Holocaust themes, but to the analysis and critique of Martin Buber and Eliezer Berkovits. Pleased because just over half the book keeps the promise of the title by offering what surely is the most lucid and perceptive critique anywhere of ma jor Jewish theologians of the Holo caust and by making a major contri bution to the question of the uniqueness of the Holocaust. This is not to imply that the first three essays are wanting in any sense. The critique of Suber's episte mology, for example, sheds light on the shortcomings of existentialist writings generally: they do not take history seriously and do not offer much help for ethics. Similarly, the second and third essays are impres sive in taking major Jewish scholars to task: Buber for misusing and dis torting Hasidic sources and Berkovits for misreading Jewish scholars. But five of the nine essays have been published before, and the first three seem simply to have needed an addi tional home. They might be regarded as bonuses in the sense that a great artistic performance may offer en cores of quite a different sort than the announced program.
Professor Katz applies impressive skills to analyzing and criticizing ma jor Jewish authors who have strug gled with questions of the Holocaust. He not only relates these authors to one another and to common rabbinic and biblical traditions but enriches the arguments with philosophical discussions, both classic and contem porary. Katz proves a master at prob ing the logic of arguments. And here lies his greatest service to the reader. He insists that theological reasoning must be as cogent as philosophical analysis. Philosophy and theology thus differ not in regard to the canons of reasoning but in their starting points or presuppositions. Argu ments of believers, therefore, are as accountable to good sense, criticism, and rebuttal as secular or philosophi cal claims-even, or perhaps espe cially, when one reflects on such in tractable issues as the Holocaust raises.
There is not much that does not fade in the bright light of Katz's analysis and critique. Indeed the reader will be inclined to ask whether there is any truth in the land or whether there are any theological in terpretations of the Holocaust that survive such severe testing. Richard Rubenstein is taken to task for psy chological revisions that result in a mystical paganism-not all that dif ferent from Nazi ideology-in which the Jew is urged to forgo history and return to the cosmic rhythms of natu ral existence. He is criticized for deal ing with the community's faith as if it were a theory or hypothesis confirm able or falsifiable by experience, for wanting to retain traditions without God when those traditions were formed in response to God, or for claiming that one may retain Judaism without a theology or without the God of history.
Emil Fackenheim retains the pres ence of God at Auschwitz but cannot link this presence adequately with the saving God of the Exodus: "If we are to count the Sho'ah as revelation, is it not the power of Satan that is disclosed rather than that of the 'liv ing God?'." Katz also objects to Fack enheim's use of Midrash, to his con cept of God, and to answers to the Holocaust that may simply reaffirm the faith rather than offer reasoned responses to Holocaust issues.
Katz questions Ignaz Maybaum's interpretation of the Holocaust as in nocent, vicarious sacrifice through which God blesses humankind and asks whether being Jewish means primarily being a lamb led to the slaughter. Moreover, the Holocaust does not lead to reconciliation but to alienation from God. Nor does May baum's concept of God fare better than Fackenheim's, for could the Lord of the covenant truly employ a "Hitler, my servant?"! Eliezer Berkovits emerges as the least objectionable of the four theolo gians scrutinized. But even he mani fests serious weaknesses that affect the abiding values of his writings. Neither his "rabbinical learning nor the dependence. upon the reference to the great Western tradition of the odicy is fully adequate to the issue of Sho'ah."
One could interpret such critical severity as an expression of theologi cal intolerance, of contempt for inter pretations and approaches the author finds to be incompatible with his own. In my judgment that would be a serious misreading of Katz's work. The quarrel is in-house, as it were. It is the commitment to a shared tradi tion and to the common effort of re sponding to an incredibly difficult task that both assures the freedom of drastic and severe inquiry and makes it obligatory. The interpretation of such liberty as inimical to the author's own approach would be mistaken in the additional sense that Katz does not offer and may not have sufficiently formulated his own an swers to the questions raised by the authors he analyzes and opposes.
That lack of constructive effort proves to be consistently frustrating to the reader. Since Katz does such splendid work in describing, analyz ing, and criticizing the major an swers, why are these skills not di rected to pointing us in more promising directions? If we are shown the avenues that turn into dead ends, might there not be more promising bearings detected by a guide so knowledgable about the landscape?
Such a complaint may be both un fair and misleading. Unfair because sound analysis and criticism consti tute services sufficient unto them selves. Misleading since the request for constructive alternatives may im ply that the faithful live by good an swers rather than by their covenant relationship with God. We may have to take our bearings from a Job who was satisfied with the divine pres ence and despises himself for his ear lier questions. And yet the vision of faith seeks clarity and coherence. It is a commandment to love the Lord with our whole mind. And in that task the community of faith inevita bly looks to its best teachers for direc tion and help. Moreover Katz does not seem averse to that search in principle. He believes that we can talk about the Holocaust. He himself points to the need for "the formula tion of a systematic and methodologi cal skeleton of a philosophy of Juda ism," which, one assumes, must be a post-Holocaust philosophy. Katz praises Jews of the past who coped with and interpreted the world's evil, who vindicated the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who "made it possible for Judaism to survive by making Jewish experience and its in herent tragedy intelligible." Katz also keeps raising crucial questions that call for a constructive response: "What does it mean to be a Jew after Auschwitz?" " [D] id God enter into covenantal relation with Abraham and his heirs only so as to crucify them?" "Has ... the God of Israel, of the Covenant, of redemption, be come another casualty of the Sho' ah?" "[W]hy, if God performed a mirai:le and entered history at the Exodus, did He show such great self-restraint at Auschwitz?" And, when Katz re proaches Maybaum for not explain ing the theological dilemmas posed by the Holocaust, he implies that such explanation is a legitimate and needed task.
Even where Katz finds Holocaust interpretations suggestive or promis ing, even where he hints at his own position, he remains reluctant to step into the breaches that his criticisms have inflicted on the theological structures of others. Flawed explana tory constructs crumble when he en circles them, but he seems unwilling to build anything more soundly de signed and stable in their place.
Two examples shall illustrate that point. Katz finds helpful Berkovits's claims that "Jewish existence per se stapds as prophetic testimony against the moral degeneracy of men and nations: it is a mocking procla mation in the face of all human idola try and witnesses to the final judg ment of history by a moral God." That belief sheds light on Israel's con tinued existence. But Katz refuses to say more than that, claiming that to do so would be to speak in the lan guage of faith to which one can only 7 witness but not argue about. At that point, as at a few similar points in these essays, Katz implies that that is all that one can say, since he sees no way of convincing anyone who does not already believe it that Jsrael._is God's people. But surely that consti tutes a non sequitur. The main task of this book is to investigate questions of faith within the circle of faith. The issues of the Holocaust are primarily issues for believers, for the communi ties of faith. And here Israel's elec tion and covenant will be assumed. Rather than ending the argument there, such declarations of faith must become the starting points for the task of comprehending whatever meanings there might be in the Holo caust. Therefore, belief in the cove nant bond and the experience of un deserved suffering become places of departure for reflections about God's ways with His people and with His world and about the right human responses to His ways. · Katz's last essay, "The 'Unique' Intentionality of the Holocaust," pro vides the second example of the au thor's reluctance to offer construc tive alternatives. He answers the question that so divides Jewish theo logians by arguing that the Holocaust was indeed unique. And its unique ness lies in the genocidal intent of the Nazis. But that answer disappoints for it is a historical answer to a theo logical question. Even if we agree with him that some forms of hatred are worse than others and that this genocidal intent was unique, what does that imply for the meaning of Jewish suffering and for the faith of Israel? Even if one agrees with his thesis that this Jewish suffering has no historical parallel, what does that imply for a faith that has encountered persecution at so many points in the past? Does the genocidal intent of the Nazis imply anything new for those who survived its devastation? And if Holocaust suffering is unique, what does that mean for the suffering of the non-Jewish victims of Hitler? Does such uniqueness deny solidar ity with other human suffering?
It is not all that difficult to argue that a major historical event such as the Holocaust is unique historically. History in a sense is always unique in that we assume time does not repeat itself and every historical period is not only new but different. But what could be the non-trivial meaning of any historical uniqueness? That meaning would have to be found in the traditions, self-understanding, and beliefs of the community that asks for the meaning of events. And the difficulty with the Holocaust is that it cannot be rendered meaning ful by prevailing traditions and be liefs. Indeed one meaning of "uniqueness" is that we do not un derstand what the Holocaust means. It does not fit; it does not lend itself to any traditional concept of God's char acter; it does not make sense that His covenant people should suffer so; it does not accommodate itself to the going interpretations of suffering, whether the model be punishment, testing, redemption, or the absence of God.
When Katz concludes that the Holo caust was unique because of the gen ocidal intent of the Nazis, he begs the question. What is the meaning of that genocidal intent for the community of faith, for its understanding, wor ship, and imitation of God? Could it be that in not facing his own conclu sion with such questions, Katz does not apply to himself the critical rigor he demands of others? His essay on uniqueness simply leaves us with the claim of historical uniqueness and never even raises theological ques tions that would make his thesis meaningful.
If Katz were to address the theo logical meaning of the Holocaust in a constructive effort, he might also shed light on the meaning of Israel's suffering. One gets the impression though the author never explicitly says so-that the uniqueness of Nazi genocidal hatred created unique suf fering on the part of jews. Less attention has been paid to these tendencies in the sociology of judaism. The author shows how frequently and how widely these various currents found expression.
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